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Abstract - Bundled discounting is one of the most unsettled areas of competition law.
The economic and legal thinking behind this particular type of unilateral practices is in
a constant state of flux. Advances in economics have illustrated a strong theoretical
case that, even though such practice generally does not raise antitrust concerns,
bundled discounting by a monopolist may nonetheless harm competition in some
circumstances. What troubles law makers and enforcement authorities, is how best to
categorise, prevent, detect, control and regulate such harm. This article attempts to
clarify as well as organise coherently some of the important components of the main
arguments presented by antitrust experts in this area. It surveys the recently proposed
antitrust liability standards on how to distinguish procompetitive and anticompetitive
bundling practices, and explores whether appropriate liability standards for analysing
bundled discounts by dominant players are now more discernible.
A. INTRODUCTION
'Bundled discounting is the practice of offering discounts or rebates
contingent upon a buyer's purchase of two or more different products." It
is one of the most unsettled areas of competition law. One of the main
reasons for this is that there has been very little case law either in the US
or EU tackling this specific subject. The explosion of academic discourse
has also been relatively recent.2 Of course, the multifaceted nature of the
issue itself has contributed to the complexity of the legal and economic
analysis in this area, as I will attempt to demonstrate throughout this
paper.
The economic and legal thinking behind this particular type of
unilateral practices is in a constant state of flux. On one hand, the
U.S. Department of Justice, 'Competition and Monopoly: Single Firm Conduct
under Section 2 of the Sherman Act' (2008), Chapter 6: Bundled Discounts and
Single-Product Loyalty Discounts,
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/reports/236681.htm> accessed on 2 July 2012.
2 R H Pate, 'The Common Law Approach and Improving Standards for Analysing
Single Firm Conduct' (Thirtieth Annual Conference on International Antitrust Law
and Policy, Fordham Corporate Law Institute, 23 October 2003)
<http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/202724.htm > accessed on 2 July 2012.
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ubiquitous nature of such arrangements provides evidentiary support for
the argument that they are usually based on good efficiency grounds and
benefit consumers. 3 On the other hand, advances in economics have
illustrated a strong theoretical case that, even though such practice
generally does not raise antitrust concerns, bundled discounting by a
monopolist may nonetheless harm competition in some circumstances.4
What troubles law makers and enforcement authorities, is how best to
categorise, prevent, detect, control and regulate such harm.
This paper's contribution is an attempt to clarify as well as organise
coherently some of the important components of the main arguments
presented by antitrust experts in this area. It surveys the recently proposed
antitrust liability standards on how to distinguish procompetitive and
anticompetitive bundling practices, and explores whether appropriate
liability standards for analysing bundled discounts by dominant players
are now more discernible.
I begin this article by offering some clarifications on current
terminology on bundling in general, and bundled discounts in particular in
part B. I focus on the variety of ways that we can sub-categorise this
particular type of unilateral practices (by thresholds, by scope of
application and by the products or set of products to which they apply) 5
and why certain sub-groups, such as individualised/loyalty discounts,
cause more antitrust concerns than others.
After that, I move onto the theoretical discussions of the economic
explanations behind bundled discounting practices. Part C exposes a
certain irrationality in the underlying assumptions that many hold and
cautions against prejudging as a result. The potential efficiencies and
strategic reasons for bundled discounting are also laid out.
Part D further qualifies the theoretical complexity of this topic. My
aim is to effectively demonstrate that a total lack of unity on the economic
theories of harm in this area is a major obstacle against designing a set of
3 See Herbert Hovenkamp, Federal Antitrust Policy: The Law of Competition and its
Practice (3rd edn, Thomson-West 2005).
4 See e.g. Bruce H. Kobayashi, 'Does Economics Provide a Reliable Guide to
Regulating Commodity Bundling by Firms? A Survey of Economic Literature' (2005)
1 Journal of Competition Law and Economics 707.
5 Damien Geradin, 'A Proposed Test for Separating Pro-competitive Conditional
Rebates form Anti-competitive Ones' (2009) 32 World Competition 41, 44.
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effective and coherent liability standards for bundled discounts. I then
examine how this problem reveals itself in practice through a general
survey of the legal landscape in part E. This covers both the case law and
the latest official reports by the relevant competition authorities in the US
and the EU.
In part F, I scrutinise the defects of the currently available tests on
bundled discounts by a close examination of the substantive categories of
the issue, including the desirability of 'safe harbours' and an efficiency
filter, as well as the predation and tying analogies of bundled discounts.
This is followed by part G in which I carry out a more contextual
study of the issues. Here I argue that law makers should bear in mind, (1)
the potential danger of chilling legitimate price-cutting by punishing
monopolists' actions on purely speculative grounds; (2) the fundamental
limitations of economics as a tool to measure the competitive effects of
such unilateral actions; (3) the error costs and trade-offs when choosing
the right analytical framework; and (4) the different purposes that
competition law regimes are designed to serve in US and Europe, and
how they inevitably affect the nature of the tests that courts and
competition authorities eventually choose to adopt. I suggest that a robust
and optimal legal test separating the procompetitive and anticompetitive
types of bundled discounting practices should be based on a thorough
understanding of the broader picture and the crucial factors at play. This
entails taking a step back and considering the contextual issues.
Finally, I conclude this paper by commenting on some recent
propositions by leading scholars on the topic of bundled discounts, as well
as joining the segments of my analysis to group them together coherently
under one single observation.
It is important, however, to note two important limitations to the
scope of this paper. First, I do not attempt to judge in an overly precise
manner the correctness of each individual economic theory mentioned in
this paper. My purpose is merely to illustrate the extent of theoretical
confusion surrounding bundled discounts and to demonstrate how it has
reflected negatively on the legal rules in this area. Secondy, although the
analysis throughout this paper does entail a comparative perspective on
the antitrust treatment of bundled discounts in the United States and
Europe, this should not primarily be viewed as an in-depth study on
whether the laws are converging or diverging in this area. The
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comparative aspect merely helps in the effort to build a better
understanding of the major sources of controversy regarding this
particular type of unilateral practice.
B. ISSUES WITH TERMINOLOGY: BUNDLING, TYING AND BUNDLED
DISCOUNTS
The terminology in the literature must first be clearly defined as differing
sources denote differing meanings when referring to certain terms.
Loosely speaking, 'bundling' is the sale of collections of goods as
packages. The composites of such collections may vary, as well as the
conditions that apply to the availability of special pricing for these
bundles.
Bundled discounting practices can take a variety of forms. In the
simplest case, there can be fixed ratio bundles where buying products A
and B as a package would result in a discount compared with buying them
'a-la-carte', nevertheless, both the bundle and the stand-along versions of
the individual goods are available. This is called 'mixed bundling'. 6 'Pure
bundling' occurs when it is only possible to buy the two products
together.
A 'lump sum discount' is a special case of an 'all units
discount'. There are also 'standardised quantity discounts' to be triggered
once the buyer passes a pre-determined quantity threshold. These can be
further divided into the following sub-groups: (1) discounts for the
incremental units above the threshold; (2) discounts for all units once
triggered by the buyer's crossing of the threshold, usually called 'first unit
discounts' or 'retroactive discounts'.9 Such quantity discounts, however,
do not always have to be standard, but can be individualised to apply
differently to different buyers. This would then turn into a type of loyalty
6 Stan J. Liebowitz and Stephen E. Margolis, 'Bundles of Joy: the Ubiquity and
Efficiency of Bundles in New Technology Markets' (2008) 5 Journal of Competition
Law and Economics 1.
Richard Whish and David Bailey, Competition Law (7th edn. OUP 2012) 689-90.
8 Nicholas Economides, 'Tying, Bundling, and Loyalty/Requirement Rebates' in Einer
Elhauge (ed), Research Handbook in the Economics ofAntitrust Law (Edward Elgar
2012).
9 ibid 132-3.
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agreement."o Another way that loyalty agreements can work is where the
buyer agrees to buy a certain share of its needs of the two products A and
B (in the simplest scenario) from the same seller, on a generally more
preferable terms than otherwise."
Economides asserts that we should be more concerned about
individualised loyalty/requirement discounts than about standardised
discounts. The reason given is that individualised discounts can be
tailored to exclude competitors.12 This also reflects the stance of the
European Commission, whose Guidance makes it clear that standardised
discounts are treated more leniently.13 It has been put forward that in the
case of standardised discounts the threshold may be too low for larger
customers to have a loyalty enhancing effect. On the other hand, an
individualised threshold allows the dominant supplier to set the threshold
at such a level that it is difficult for customers to switch supplier, thus
creating maximum loyalty enhancing effects and helps to extract even
more surplus for the monopolist.14
A volume discount tends to be more restrictive for the reason that it
will not require that the buyer makes fewer purchases from the
competitor(s) and thus still leaves open for it to buy from rivals at
competitive prices." Conditional discounts that apply to all units are in
general more problematic than those that apply only to incremental units.
The reason given is that such type of discounts typically has an
exclusionary purpose.
10 ibid.
" ibid 121-2.
12 ibid 132-3.
13 European Commission, 'Guidance on the Commission's Enforcement Priorities in
Applying Article 82 of the EC Treaty to Abusive Exclusionary Conduct by Dominant
Undertakings' COM (2009) 864 available at
http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/index.html accessed on 2 July 2012.
Note that all references to art. 82 in the Guidance should be understood as references
to the current art 102 of the Treaty on the Function of the European Union (as
renamed by the Treaty of Lisbon, which entered into force on 1 December 2009).
14 ibid para. 45.
'5 Einer Elhauge, 'Tying, Bundled Discounts, and the Death of the Single Monopoly
Profit Theory'(2009) 123 Harvard Law Review 397, 451-3, 456.
16 Economides (n 8) 132-4.
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Closely related to the idea of bundling and bundled discounts is the
practice of 'tying' or 'tie-in sale', which refer to the types of
arrangements whereby a buyer's access to the tying good is conditioned
on him consenting to purchase a certain amount of one or more tied goods
from the seller. 1 This can include, amongst others, contractual tying,
where the tie is the result of a specific stipulation, or technical tying,
where the tied product is physically integrated into the tying product.' 8
The focus of this essay is on the subject of bundled discounts in its variety
of forms. However, I will also discuss the issue regarding tying and
bundling in general where relevant.
C. POTENTIAL PROCOMPETITIVE BENEFITS
1. Underlying Assumptions
One of the first problems with determining a proper legal test for bundled
discounts is that there are some underlying assumptions about such
practices which, if not dealt with correctly, could potentially make our
subsequent analysis less rigorous.
Firstly, the word 'discount' has tricked many into thinking that such
offerings are 'presumptively procompetitive' because they must lower
prices to buyers. Such an assumption can be highly misleading.1 9 In fact,
all it means is that buyers who comply with the bundle will be charged
less than those who do not.20 It would be incorrect to automatically
assume that that the noncompliant prices equal the but-for prices (the
prices that would have prevailed 'but for' the bundling).2 1 Such offerings,
therefore, need not reflect true discounts at all. This is mainly due to the
fundamental fact that the monopolist can set the noncompliant prices at
whatever level it wishes. As Elhauge further exposes, if the noncompliant
17 Liebowitz and Margolis (n 6) 3.
18 Whish and Bailey (n 7) 689.
19 Daniel A. Crane, 'Mixed Bundling, Profit Sacrifice, and Consumer Welfare' (2006)
55 Emory LJ423, 465; Thomas A. Lambert, 'Evaluating Bundled Discounts' (2005)
89 Minn. L. Rev. 1688, 1726.
20 Einer Elhauge (n 15) 450.
21 ibid.
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prices charged exceeds the but-for levels, then the bundling practice is, in
fact, penalising the buyers who refuse the bundle.22
Secondly, discounting practices in general are so pervasive in
character and employed on such a regular basis by small and large
businesses, that many assume it has a generally procompetitive nature.23
Posner remarked that 'if the practice is one employed widely in industries
that resemble the monopolist's but are competitive, there should be a
presumption that the monopolist is entitled to use it as well.' 2 4 This view
is also adopted by many others who stress the fact that a great deal of
bundling takes place in industries in which there appears to be
considerable competition, and therefore they must have good efficiency
25
explanations. In other words, bundling, including bundled discounts,
may well have similar efficient characteristics when practiced by
monopolists.
I argue against pre-judging monopolists' actions under any
circumstances. The theoretical possibility of unilateral actions being
carried out for efficiency reasons should, of course, form part of the
examination process. However, to allow assumptions of a pro-competitive
nature of bundled discounting practices to influence the subsequent
analysis to more than a fair degree would be highly unfortunate.
Creating a set of coherent and effective liability standards for
bundled discounting practices that are based on sound economic and legal
principles should entail a careful balancing act. Over-expansion of
monopolist power threatening the competitiveness of the market and in
22 ibid.
23 Sherman Act s.2 Joint Hearing: Academic Testimony Hr'g Tr. 136, Jan. 31, 2007
(Rubinfiled) stating that bundled discouting is 'quite ubiquitous and often is
procompetitive'; Sherman Act s.2 Joint Hearing: Loyalty Discounts Session Hr'g Tr.
59, Nov.29, 2006 (Kattan) stating that 'the prevalence' of bundled discounts and
discounts having a retroactive feature 'by firms that don't have market power and
have no hope of excluding competitors would suggest... that there is a good
possibility that the efficiency explanation for these practices is the dominant one.'
24 Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law (2nd edn, UOC Press 2001) 253.
25Hazlett TW, 'Shedding Tiers for a-la-Carte? An Economic Analysis of Cable TV
Pricing' (2006) 5 Journal on Telecommunications & High Technology Law 253;
David Evans and Michael Salinger, 'Why Do Firms Bundle and Tie? Evidence from
Competitive Markets and Implications for Tying Law'(2005) 22Yale Journal on
Regulation 37.
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turn causing a reduction in consumer welfare is, of course, highly
undesirable. However, there is also the real danger of chilling desirable
business activities. A more rational test would, for example, analyse
whether the unbundled prices are greater or lower than but-for levels and
then consider the effects under both possibilities.
2. Potential Efficiencies and Strategic Reasons for Bundled
Discounting
There are many efficiencies potentially associated with bundled discounts.
These can be to lower a firm's costs; 26 to reflect economies of scale or
* 27*
scope in either manufacturing or transacting; to induce existing
customers to try new products or services and giving retailers incentives
to promote particular product and service offerings; 28 and maybe even to
take advantage of the fact that different buyers have varying demand
elasticities for individual goods and thus to price discriminate in a way
that increase the firm's output and reduce distribution costs. 29
However, what can be deduced from above is only that theoretically
speaking, it is perceivable that a monopolist has perfectly innocent
intentions in engaging in the bundling practices in question. This,
however, should not automatically translate into zero liability.
Sound legal rules in such a market-oriented area of the law should be
based on objective evaluations informed by rigorous economic analysis
and guided by clear goals of the overall competition law regime. As
consumer welfare is recognised widely as the central standard for
competition law,30 I believe it should also be the fundamental criteria used
to assess whether a certain cause of action should attract antitrust liability
or not. Such an approach would entail, for example, that some of the
efficiencies to be translated into an increase in consumer surplus, and not
to be captured by intermediaries, such as dealers and agents.
26 US Department of Justice, 'Section 2 Report' (n 1) p. 96.
27 David Evans and Michael Salinger, (n 25) pp. 37, 41.
28 Sherman Act s.2 Joint Hearing: Loyalty Discounts Session Hr'g Tr. 59, Nov.29,
2006 (Timothy J. Muris).
29 Phillip E. Areeda and Herbert Hovenkamp, Antitrust Law (2007 Supp.) 263-64.
30 Neelie Kroes 'European Competition Policy - Delivering Better Markets and Better
Choices' <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=SPEECH/05/512>
accessed on 2 July 2012; State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 15 (1997).
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D. Is THERE A UNIFYING THEORY OF HARM?
The other major problem is that in the current economic thinking on
bundling and tying there is no unifying theory of harm. There are a wide
range of theoretical possibilities, including price discrimination,
foreclosure or leverage of monopoly across markets, and softening of
price competition.31
The purpose of this section is to present an organised group of key
theoretical possibilities in this area without detouring into the heavy and
substantive economic analysis on the correctness of these theories and the
extent to which they reflect why monopolists operate in reality. My goal
is to qualify the theoretical complexity in this area. I will then
demonstrate how this is a major hurdle in designing a rational legal test
for bundled discounts in the next section of this paper.
1. Price Discrimination
In the case of mixed bundling, price discrimination can be achieved where
two products (A and B) are offered separately at E20 and E20, but they are
offered as bundle at E30. Those who value A/B at more than E20 but the
entire bundle at less than £30 will buy only A/B. Those who value the
bundle at more than £30 will buy the bundle or one of the products by
itself. This sort of scheme can bring customers into the market who value
A and B separately at less than £20 but the bundle at more than £30.
Walker notes that this form of price discrimination is likely to be pro-
competitive. However, the social welfare effect is actually ambiguous. 32
2. Entry Deterrence
Incentives for new entrants into the market may be lowered because the
monopolist has created/raised barriers for them to compete as efficient
competitors. Buyers entering the rebate schemes can reduce the scale of
rivals and thus increase their costs. In any case, customers will decide to
break their contract with the monopolist only if it is compensated by
31 Mike Walker, 'Bundling: Are US and European Views Converging?' (2008) 4
Euro. C. J 275.
32 ibid.
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lower price. 3 3 Bundling may also make it economically unprofitable for
an entrant to enter one market without simultaneously entering the second
market, and this acts as an entry-deterring device. 3 4
3. Foreclosure to Leverage Monopoly across Markets
By the same logic, competitiveness of a rival can be impaired through
market foreclosure. With the rebate schemes in place, rivals can be forced
to a smaller market share and thus will have higher unit costs in the
presence of fixed costs, and will be marginalised or forced to exit the
market.3 5
There are numerous versions of this entry deterrence argument. If
product B is only useful when used in conjunction with product A, then
the monopolist of product A can simply foreclose the market for product
B to other suppliers by bundling the two products together. Thus, the
monopolist might be able to use its monopoly of product A to also
become a monopolist of product B. Whether the dominant firm has an
incentive to do this is not always clear. Nevertheless, the theory is that
competitors tend to be foreclosed in the non-monopolised market so that
in the long run they are eliminated. The monopolist can then set a higher
price in the second market in the future to the extent that rivals driven out
find it difficult to make a re-entry. In this way, consumer surplus could be
further reduced in the medium and long run.
The other version of the entry deterrence argument is that bundling
can be used by monopolists to price the competitive product lower, thus
leading to market foreclosure. This is based on the idea that competition
in bundles is fiercer than competition between individual products, since a
firm that sells in bundles has to lose two margins instead of one when it
fails to make a sale. 36 This important factor induces the monopolist to
compete even more aggressively. In this particular case, the short run
benefit of lower prices could lead to consumer harm if outweighed by
33 Nicholas Economides and loannis Lianos, 'The Elusive Antitrust Standard on
Bundling in Europe and in the United States in the Aftermath of the Microsoft Cases'
(2009-10) 76 Antitrust LJ 483.
34 Aaron S. Edlin and Daniel L. Rubinfeld, 'Exclusion or Efficient Pricing? The "Big
Deal" Bundling of Academic Journals'(2004) 72 Antitrust LJ 119.
35 Economides (n 8) 124.
36 Walker (n 31).
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longer term dynamic loss, such as through reduced innovation by new
entrants. Consumer harm can also be caused by the rise in prices once
potential entrants have disappeared. The worry is that the rival may
conclude that fighting with the monopolist is unlikely to be profitable,
resulting in them not innovating or entering in the first place. 3 7
4. Softening of Price Competition
In theory, when the monopolist is engaged in bundling, any reduction in
the price charged by a producer of only product B will lead to a smaller
increase in demand for this supplier than would be the case if the
monopolist was not bundling. This is because the number of consumers
who would have switched in the absence of bundling to product B will
now not switch in the presence of bundling because they value product A
highly. If the benefit in cutting prices is lessened, a company will
typically price higher. This is one way in which bundling can soften price
competition and hence cause consumer harm.38
Another version of this theory is that bundling practices by a
monopolist has the effect of increasing price differentiation. Depending
on the strength of competition between suppliers of only product B, this
may lead to a softening of prices.39
5. Externality Problems and the 'Prisoners' Dilemma'
In any given situation, buyers would usually comply with the
loyalty/requirement program rather than buying a-la-carte. The incentive
is fuelled by externality problems: it seems rational to agree to it for a
nominal individual discount, assuming that the wider market is not
affected by its decision. 4 0 However, once a large number of buyers buy
under condition, the monopolist increases in market power and is able to
increase both the a-la-carte and the bundled prices.4 1
Therefore, it cannot be inferred that complying with the bundled
discounting arrangement necessarily makes buyers better off than in the
37 ibid.
38 ibid.
39 ibid.
40 Joseph Farrell, 'Deconstructing Chicago on Exclusive Dealing' (2005) 50 Antitrust
Bulletin 465, 476.
41 Econornides (n 8) 130-1.
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but-for world.4 2 This is why bundling can make consumers worse off even
where they have the choice of whether or not to comply with the offerings.
Their individually rational decisions collectively strengthen the
monopolist, allowing it to increase both the d-la-carte and bundled prices,
thereby extracting more surplus than in unbundled monopoly.
This, as theorised by Economides, is something similar to the
'prisoners' dilemma', where both buyers accept the bundling deal with
the aim of putting themselves in a better situation but both become worse
off than if neither accepted the deal. 4 Additionally, the externality
problems are made worse when the relevant buyers are not consumers,
but dealers and agents alike who are the intermediaries that resell to
others. It has been argued that intermediate buyers are even more likely to
agree to such rebate schemes because they can pass on much if not all of
the price increase to downstream buyers and thus externalise an even
higher percentage of the harm. 44
6. Switching Costs
As highlighted by the EU Guidance, 'retroactive rebates may foreclose
the market significantly, as they may make it less attractive for customers
to switch small amounts of demand to an alternative suppler, if this would
lead to loss of the retroactive rebates.'4 5
Furthermore, buyers who once purchased a large percentage of their
needs from one seller may not want to buy a small percentage of their
needs from another, for reasons such as the extra costs and effort in
training personnel in a new product and compatibility issues. Therefore, it
42 Einer Elhauge and Abraham L. Wickelgren, 'Anti-Competitive Exclusion and
Market Division through Loyalty Discounts' Harvard M. Olin Centre for Law,
Economics, and Business, Discussion Paper 707
<http://www.law.harvard.edu/faculty/elhauge/pdf/Elhauge-Wickelgren%/o20Anti-
Competitive%20Exclusion.pdf> accessed on 2 July 2012.
43 Economides (n 8) 132.
44 Jose Miguel Abito and Julian Wright, 'Exclusive Dealing with Imperfect
Downstream Competition' (2008) 26 International Journal ofIndustrial Organization
227.
45 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13) para 40.
153
UCL Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence
is possible that the impact of the loyalty/requirement program is larger
than the share thresholds on which it is based.46
E. A GENERAL SURVEY OF THE CURRENT LEGAL LANDSCAPE
In parts C and D, I have illustrated how the theoretical literature on
bundling and bundled discounts in particular has generated a variety of
possibilities. Kobayashi gives an excellent summary of the main problems
arising from the conceptual chaos: literature in this area is 'sparse'. 4 7
Moreover, 'the incremental cost tests and the consumer welfare tests may
be difficult to administer', and 'tests based on whether an equally efficient
competitor could be excluded may condemn welfare-increasing
behaviour.' 48
I am now going to illustrate how such difficulties have revealed
themselves in practice.
1. US Case Law
SmithKline Corp. v Eli Lilly & Co. 49 was one of the earliest cases in the
US involving bundled discounts. The court found that SmithKline would
have had to offer a rebate of more than 20% on its one product to match
Lilly's bundled rebate, and if SmithKline had done so, its drug would not
have been sufficiently profitable to justify remaining in the market, even
if SmithKline had been able to 'reduce its costs of goods to Lilly's
level.' 5 0 The court concluded that because Lilly's bundled rebates would
have excluded SmithKline even if the latter firm were an equally efficient
producer, there was a violation of s. 2 of the Sherman Act by Lilly in
using its monopoly power in two products to exclude the slightly less
efficient' SmithKline from the market for a competitive product.5
46 Economides (n 8) 133-4.
47 Bruce Kobayashi, 'The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the
United States' (2005) 1 Competition Policy International 115.
48 ibid 147.
49 427 F. Supp. 1089 (E.D. Pa. 1976), aff'd, 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978).
50 ibid 110809; US Department of Justice, 'Section 2 Report' (n 1).
51 ibid 1128-29; US Department of Justice, 'Section 2 Report' (n 1).
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However in Ortho Diagnostic Systems which involved similar
bundled-pricing plan, the court found no violation of s.2.52 The Court
framed the key question as 'whether a firm that enjoys a monopoly on one
or more of a group of complementary products, but which faces
competition on others, can price all of its products above average variable
cost and yet still drive an equally efficient competitor out of the market.' 5 3
The court further explained that a plaintiff 'must allege and prove either
that (1) the monopolist has priced below its average variable cost or (2)
the plaintiff is at least as efficient a producer of the competitive product as
the defendant, but that the defendant's pricing makes it unprofitable for
the plaintiff to continue to produce the product.' 54 And because Ortho did
not claim that it could not sell its products at a profit as a result of
Abbott's bundled discounting, the count found no s.2 violation.
The focus on the actual plaintiffs costs and whether the actual
plaintiff was an equally efficient competitor have since been criticised55
and amended in Cascade Health Solutions 5 6 to be the costs of a
hypothetical equally efficient competitor. The test became whether a
hypothetically equally efficient producer of the competitive product could
meet the defendant's discount.57
Virgin v British Airways58 also involved a bundled-discount claim,
despite the fact that it was primarily viewed as a single product loyalty
discount case. Virgin Atlantic alleged British Airways' rebates would
result in corporate customers that purchased tickets on British Airways
monopoly routes having an incentive to purchase British Airways tickets
on routes where Virgin Atlantic competed, even though the latter charged
less. 59 The court however refused to impose liability for the main reason
52 Ortho Diagnostic Systems, Inc. v Abbott Laboratories, Inc. 920 F. Supp. 455
(S.D.N.Y. 1996).
53 ibid. 467.
54 ibid. 469.
E.g. Areeda and Hovenkamp (n 29).
56 Cascade Health Solutions v PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 905-08 (9th Cir. 2008).
57 ibid.
58 Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltdv British Airwaysplc 257 F3d 256 (2d Cir 2001).
59 ibid 580.
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that Virgin Atlantic provided no factual evidence to support the
theoretical possibility of below-cost pricing.60
These cases provide a good illustration of the line of thought
deployed by some circuits of the US Court of Appeal: accepting mixed
bundling as lawful if the effective price charged for one or more products
in the bundle is not below some measure of cost.
However, there are other circuits in the US that have adopted a more
aggressive attitude, considering that bundled discounts may amount to
anticompetitive behaviour even when the dominant firm would not be
liable under a cost-based rule such as that adopted in cases like Cascade
Health Solutions.61
This approach is more enforcement oriented: the central issue is
whether bundled pricing strategies may foreclose or exclude equally
efficient rivals, even if the discount results in prices that are above the
dominant firm's costs.62 In such cases the courts make a more direct
analogy between bundled discounts and tying in a traditional sense, as all
these practices may lead to anticompetitive market foreclosure.
The Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit made an explicit analogy
between bundled rebates and tying in LePage's.63 The defendant, 3M,
argued its bundled rebates were legal as it never priced its transparent tape
below its cost. Instead of examining whether 3M's price was below a
certain measure of its cost, the court in this case applied an
anticompetitive foreclosure test, or an abbreviated rule of reason approach:
'the principal anticompetitive effect of bundled rebates... is that when
offered by a monopolist they may foreclose portions of the market to a
potential competitor who does not manufacture an equally diverse group
of products and who therefore cannot make a comparable offer.' 64 The
court held that 3M's practice had 'long-term' anticompetitive effects,
60 ibid 580-1.
61 E.g. SmithKline Corp. v Eli Lilly & Co., 575 F.2d 1056 (3d Cir. 1978); LePage's Inc.
v 3M, 324 F.3d 141 (3d Cir. 2003); United States v Dentsply Int'l, Inc., 399 F.3d 181
(3d Cir.2005).
62 Economides and Lianos, (n 33).
63 LePage's Inc. v 3M, 324 F.3d 141, 155 (3d Cir.2003).
64 ibid para 57.
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without 3M offering any adequate business justifications for its
65
practices.
In affirming the finding of illegal conduct under s. 2, the Third
Circuit Court of Appeals in LePage's 66 held that the rebates program 'has
made it very difficult or impossible for competitors to engage in fair
competition.' 6 7 This case has since been correctly criticised as being too
vague and not providing any useful guidance. 68
However, the bigger source of controversy is the fact that the
anticompetitive foreclosure test applied by the court in this case meant
that it is possible to cause s. 2 violation even though the excluded rival
was less efficient than the defendant. As the dissenting judge in this case
remarked, 'LePage's is not as efficient a tape producer as 3M', which
makes this case an uncomfortable departure from the previous line of
authorities on this matter, which all adopted some sort of a price-cost
test.69
Subsequently the district court in Cascade Health Solutions based
their bundling instruction on LePage 's standard. 70 However, the district
court's decision was reversed when the case reached the Ninth Circuit for
the reason that it potentially allowed for liability even when the plaintiff
was less efficient than the defendant, and 'it does not consider whether
the bundled discounts constitute competition on the merits, but simply
concludes that all bundled discounts offered by a monopolist are
anticompetitive with respect to its competitors who do not manufacture an
equally diverse product line.' 7 1 It was thus held that an antitrust plaintiff
can prove that a bundled discount was exclusionary or predatory under s.
2 of the Sherman Act only if the plaintiff establishes that, 'after allocating
the discount given by the defendant on the entire bundle of the products to
65 ibid para 99.
66 LePage 's Inc. v 3M cert. denied, 124 S Ct 2932 (2004).
67 ibid para 145 (quoting the trial court).
68 E.g., Masimo Corp. v Tyco Health Care Group, L.P. No. CV 02-4770 MRP, 2006
WL 1236666, *14 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 22, 2006); Information Resources, Inc. v Dun &
Bradstreet Corp., 359 F. Supp.2d 307 (S.D.N.Y.2004); Invacare Corp. v Respironics
Inc., No. 1:04 CV 1580, 2006 WL 3022968, *12 (N.D. Ohio Oct. 23, 2006).
69 LePage 's (n 63) para 191 (Greenberg. J, dissenting).
70 Cascade Health Solutions (n 56) at 11211-2.
71 ibid at 11214.
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the competitive product or products, the defendant sold the competitive
product or products below its average variable costs of producing them.' 72
2. Recent US Political Developments
In reaching its decision, the court in Cascade Health Solutions in part
followed the proposal of a discount attribution/allocation test by the
Antitrust Modernisation Commission (AMC).73
According to the AMC test, the entirety of the discounts on a bundle
is attributed to the more competitive of the two products. It then tests
whether the resulting hypothetical 'effective' price established through
this method of attribution is above a measure of avoidable cost. 74 The
AMC uses the words 'incremental costs' in its cost criterion, often
average variable cost is used instead.7 5 An antitrust violation would be
found in cases where (1) the effective price is below the average variable
cost of product B of the monopolist in product A; and (2) the dominant
firm is likely to recoup its losses; and (3) the requirement contract is
76likely to have anti-competitive consequences.
The AMC also proposed that a cost-based safe harbour should be
established if the hypothetical effective price established through this
three-stage attribution process is above the avoidable cost of the
monopolist for product B.
The AMC's proposition was later embraced by the US Department
of Justice in its Section 2 Report 7 In cases where bundle-to-bundle
competition was not possible, the DOJ proposed a 'discount allocation
safe harbour', whereby there would only be abuse of s. 2 if the plaintiff
showed that the defendant sold the competitive product at an imputed
price (i.e. the price after allocating all discounts and rebates attributable to
72 ibid at 11233-4.
73 Antitrust Modernization Commission, 'Report and Recommendations', 88 (2007)
<http://govinfo.1ibrary.unt.edu/amc/report recommendation/amcfinal report.pdf>
accessed on 2 July 2012.
74 ibid 12, recommendation 17.
75 Economides (n 8) 137, esp. fn 55.
76 ibid.
7 7Antitrust Modernization Commission (n.72).
78 Department of Justice, 'Section 2 Report' (n 1).
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the entire bundle to the competitive product) that was below the product's
incremental costs.79
This report, however, has since been withdrawn by the DOJ
Antitrust Division under the Obama administration.8 0 The position of the
new administration with regard to the price-cost based test is still
unclear.8'
The withdrawal itself is quite significant in that it marked an
important change in the attitude of the US authorities regarding the
treatment of single-firm conduct in general. Recall that just a few years
ago there were commentators remarking that the authorities and courts in
the US have generally adopted a less interventionist approach towards
rebates and discounts, preferring to focus on whether anti-competitive
effects are realistic or not.82 By 2009 the US authorities were seriously
questioning the notion that most unilateral conduct is driven by efficiency
and that monopoly markets are generally self-correcting. The withdrawal
of the 'Section 2 Report' shows a new reluctance on relying on the
marketplace alone to ensure that competition and consumers are protected,
and that overly cautious approaches and hesitancy in the face of potential
abuses by monopoly firms are no longer supported or encouraged. Indeed,
the press release states that 'withdrawing the section 2 report is a shift in
philosophy and the clearest way to let everyone know that the Antitrust
Division will be aggressively pursuing cases where monopolists try to use
their dominance in the marketplace to stifle competition and harm
consumers.' 8 3
3. EU Case Law and the Foreclosure Standard
EU case law draws no distinction between single product rebates and
bundled discounts. Instead, the case law distinguishes between volume
79 ibid.
80 Department of Justice, Press Release, 'Justice Department Withdraws Report on
Antitrust Monopoly Law' (May 11 2009)
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/press-releases/2009/245710.htm> accessed on 2
July 2012.
81 Economides and Lianos (n 33) 18.
82 Christian Ahlborn and David Bailey, 'Discounts, Rebates and Selective Pricing by
Dominant Firms: A Trans-Atlantic Comparison' (2006) 2 Eur. Competition J 101.
83 Department of Justice, Press Release (n 80).
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(quantity discounts), which are legal per se, and loyalty rebates, which are
illegal in most circumstances. The European Courts have so far adopted a
foreclosure test without requiring any evidence to show that the discount
on the competitive product was below an appropriate level of the
defendant's cost.
Cases such as Hoffmann-La Roche84 and BPB Indus. Plc85 have
shown that a dominant firm can grant quantity discounts without
infringing art. 102 (formerly, art. 82) of the Treaty on the Functioning of
the European Union 86 if these are offered on equal terms to all customers
of the firm, and the discounts reflect efficiency gains: e.g. cost savings,
economies of scale. On the other hand, loyalty rebates rewarding
exclusivity or strongly encouraging the customer to stay with the supplier
may be considered illegal under the same article.
In the Hoffmann-La Roche case, for example, the discounts were
conditioned upon the customer obtaining from the dominant defendant
firm all or most of its requirements on vitamins. The court said that the
rebate was conditional on purchasing mainly or exclusively from the
dominant undertaking and therefore abusive in principle. It subsequently
ruled that the conditional rebates in question foreclosed the access of rival
products in the market, and therefore amounted to unlawful tie-in and
infringed art. 82(d).
Recent European case law has focused on targeted retroactive
discounts producing an exclusionary and loyalty effect. Such practices are
generally found to violate art. 102 when they can cause, without any
objective economic justification, the entry of rivals into the market to be
more difficult, thus creating an exclusionary effect.88
84 Case 85/76 Hoffmann-La Roche & Co. v Commission, 1979 ECR 461 (ECJ)
85 Case T-65/89 BPB Indus. Plc v Commission, 1993 ECR 11-389 (Court of First
Instance).
86 Consolidated Version of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union
[2010] C83/47 <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:C:2010:083:0047:0200:EN:PDF>
accessed on 2 July 2012.
87 Hoffmann-La Roche (n 84) 89-90, 110-11.
88 E.g., Case C-95/04 British Airways v Commission, 2007 ECR 1-2331, 68-69.
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In Michelin H,89 the Court of First Instance (CFI) found standardised
sales targets over a relatively long period were abusive under art. 82. The
specific nature of the loyalty scheme was such that it put pressure to buy
wholly or mainly from Michelin and effectively to tie the dealer to
Michelin. 90
A remarkable fact of the Michelin H decision was that the CFI found
it irrelevant that the market shares and the sales of Michelin fell during
the rebate scheme, reasoning that the fall in Michelin's sales and market
shares would have been even greater had the rebate scheme not been
adopted. 91 The central consideration of the court was that 'not all
competition on price can be regarded as legitimate', 92 highlighting a
strong contrast between EU and US in judicial attitude towards this type
of 'price' competition. 93
British Airways tested the CFI's assessment of the exclusionary
character of its reward scheme before the European Court of Justice. 9 4
Upholding the commission's prohibition decision, Advocate General
Kokott expressed that:9 5
Article 82, like the other competition rules of the Treaty, is not designed only or
primarily to protect the immediate interests of individual competitors or
consumers, but to protect the structure of the market and thus competition as
such (as an institution).... In this way, consumers are also indirectly protected.
Because where competition is damaged, disadvantages for consumers are also to
be feared.
Slightly reformulating the restrictive position of Michelin H and being
more explicit in its language, the judges of the ECJ adopted an approach
89 Case T-203/01 Manufacture Frangaise des Pneumatiques Michelin v Commission
(Michelin II) 2003 ECR 11-4071.
90 ibid 245.
9' ibid.
92 ibid 97.
93 Economides and Lianos (n 33) 21.
94 British Airways (n 88).
95 ibid, Opinion of AG Kokott <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004CC0095:EN:NOT>
accessed on 2 July 2012.
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where the exclusionary effects can be 'counterbalanced' by 'advantages
in terms of efficiency which also benefit the consumer.' 9 6
4. The EU Commission and the Rise of the Price-Cost Test
What we saw from the above overview of the case law by the EU
judiciary was that loyalty inducing schemes were prohibited per se, and
they are symptomatic of a broader trend in the application of EC law to
unilateral conduct, which has not been based on sufficient economic
analysis.
With the aim of reconsidering the law and policy under the then
article 82 (currently, art. 102), the Commission published the Discussion
Paper which suggested a predatory pricing approach for exclusionary
practices. 97 The incremental prices are compared to long run incremental
costs. If it appears that incremental prices are below long run incremental
costs, then we need to see whether there is any potential for exclusionary
effect covering a significant portion of the market. The bundling in
question may be abusive if it does. 9 8 This approach was finally adopted in
the Commission Guidance.9 9
Additionally, the Commission rejected the distinctions among
quantity loyalty, and target rebates that were previously employed by the
courts. Instead, it divided rebate practice into two categories. The first
was the single-product rebate systems of dominant firms that have effects
in the dominated market. The Commission treated this first type as a form
of price-abuse and advocated examining them under price-cost standards.
This was an important shift from the current approach adopted by the CFI
and the ECJ on rebates, which employs the anticompetitive foreclosure
standard and does not provide for a safe harbour for discount practices.
Secondly, the Discussion Paper separately categorised mixed bundling
practices or bundled discounts that produce effects on other markets or on
different products of the same market. There is some confusion caused
96 British Airways (n 88) para 86.
97 European Commission, 'DG Competition Discussion Paper on the Application of
Article 82 of the Treaty to exclusionary abuses', December 2005 (hereinafter,
Discussion Paper) <http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/art82/discpaper205.pdf>
accessed on 2 July 2012.
98 ibid.
99 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13).
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by the fact that the Commission, while analysing bundled discounts in the
section devoted to tying practices, also classified them as a pricing
abuse. 100 I will elaborate on the price/non-price dichotomy in the
Commission's approach in later parts of this paper.
The EU approach to bundling under art. 102 is not clear mainly due
to the fact that the EU Commission is constrained by the European's
Courts' case law, which is not always consistent with the Commission's
preferred approach.
F. SUBSTANTIVE CATEGORIES: DEFECTS IN CURRENT TESTS
To put it in the simplest way, what the general survey of the current legal
landscape as above has demonstrated is the unsatisfactory nature of the
antitrust standards on bundled discounting practices in the US and the EU.
The problem is not merely to do with the great theoretical difficulties in
finding a single formulation that captures the essence of this complex area
of competition law; it also has everything to do with how the judiciary
and the relevant authorities have so far been unable to translate however
little economic rationales there are into effective legal rules. I will now
analyse some of the major defects in the current rules and tests in the US
and the EU. This will include the test proposed by the AMC which,
despite having been withdrawn, still provides much valuable food for
thought.
1. Is there a Need for 'Safe Harbours'?
Geradin makes the point that even if we already have an antitrust regime
that is coherently and conceptually clear, it is likely to require complex
assessments both for the relevant authorities ex-post and the firms ex-ante,
which will involve the deployment of significant resources.101 Such an
assessment will always involve a degree of uncertainty. Safe harbours add
certainty to administrative rules on bundled discounts.
Baumol asserts that 'in a world in which vigorous competition is all
too easily mistaken for predation, and in which firms can unintentionally
overstep the line, it is important to provide managers with guidelines as
unambiguous as the issue permits, to enable them to tailor their decisions
100 EU Commission, Discussion Paper (n 97).
101 Geradin (n 5) 41-70.
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in a way that ensures compliance with the law and minimises
vulnerability to anticompetitive lawsuits intended to handicap vigorous
competition.'1 02
Thus, the value of 'safe harbours' is giving firms 'immediate
assurance' 103, without having to invest significant amounts of time and
resources in a full-scale analysis on the prospects of attracting challenges
by the competition authorities, or indeed liabilities. This could only work
if (1) the 'safe harbours' are clearly marked out; and (2) the competition
authorities can commit themselves to it by not raising challenges on those
schemes falling inside the safe harbour.
The European Commission stated in its Guidance that, 'as long as
the effective price remains consistently above the LRAIC of the dominant
undertaking, this would normally allow an equally efficient competitor to
compete profitably notwithstanding the rebate.' 104 However it has also
showed its willingness to deviate from such a standard in certain cases to
protect less efficient competitors by recognising that 'in certain
circumstances a less efficient competitor may also exert a constraint
which should be taken into account when considering whether a particular
price-based conduct leads to anticompetitive foreclosure.' 105 This
uncertainty is regrettable in that firms may accordingly avoid pursuing
certain pro-competitive rebate schemes because they are concerned by the
possibility of ensuring antitrust implications.
On the other hand, where bundle-to-bundle competition is not
possible, the 'discount allocation safe harbour' devised in the US DOJ
Section 2 Report was later withdrawn under the Obama administration.106
The fact that the new administration's stance is unclear only adds to the
uncertainties in this area.
What we need, therefore, is a clear and unambiguous position on the
issue of 'safe harbours' in both the US and Europe that will both save
resources for the competition authorities in their investigation of the
102 William J. Baumol, 'Predation and the Logic of the Average Variable Cost Test'
(1996) 39 Journal ofLaw and Economics 49, 51.
103 Geradin, (n 5).
104 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13) para 43 (emphasis added).
105 ibid para 24.
106 Department of Justice, Press Release (n 80).
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conduct in question, as well as provide useful guidance to the firms in
their efforts to devise better strategies that are competitively safe.' 07
2. What Quantity of the Competitive Product should be Used?
The AMC used the total sales quantity of the 'competitive product' in
calculating the hypothetical attribution price, whereas the EU made a
distinction between the 'contestable' and 'incontestable' parts of the
demand."
The EU Guidance Paper has defined the 'contestable part of the
market' as 'the amount for which the customer may prefer and be able to
find substitutes.' 109 In applying this standard in the Intel decision, the
European Commission notes that the contestable part of the market can be
small.1 0 The fact that in many markets, a significant portion of the sales
of the dominant firm is uncontested by competitors is due to a number of
considerations. These can include factors such as reputation, fear of
punishment from the executives following a decision not to buy from the
dominant firm, limited competitor production capacity and
complementary investments by buyers of the dominant product."
Economides has argued that the EU's approach is the correct one for
the reason that a monopolist is already able to sell units at full price in
relation to the incontestable part of the buyers' demand. Therefore, the
requirement/loyalty 'discount' is in fact aimed to win for the dominant
firm the contestable part of the demand. Thus it is this part of the demand
that constitutes the appropriate number of units to which the attribution is
applied.112 This element is crucial to the discount attribution test because
typically 'the liability test will be more likely to find liability if the
107 Jonathan M. Jacobson, 'Exploring the Antitrust Modernization's Proposed Test for
Bundled Pricing' (Summer 2007) Antitrust 22.
108 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13) para 39.
109 ibid; see also Michelin 1I(n 89) paras 162-3; British Airways (n 88) paras 277-8.
110 COMP/C-3/37.990 (13 May 2009)
<http://ec.europa.eu/competition/antitrust/cases/dec-docs/37990/37990_3581_11 .pdf>
accessed on 2 July 2012.
"' Economides (n 8) 30.
112 ibid 31.
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discount is applied to the contestable units rather than the all sales of the
monopolist.'l 3
3. Which Company's Costs should be Used?
The dominant firm's costs are used to calculate avoidable cost in both the
AMC and the EU tests. Due to the presence of economies of scale, a
monopolist with high market share would incur lower average costs than
rivals who are equally efficient (i.e. the same average cost function), only
producing at lower market share.
The question is whether such a rival should be deemed less efficient
even if it would have the same level of average cost as the dominant firm
if it had the same scale of production.11 4 In fact, it has been pointed out by
Elhauge that the monopolist is more likely to be found to have no liability
because the test has already been weakened by the large scale of the
monopolist: an effect of its anticompetitive actions in the first place.'1 5
This is equally relevant in cases where the products of the dominant firm
and the rival differ, because the costs can be adjusted to take into account
the quality differences.
4. The Desirability of an Efficiency Filter
The idea of the discount attribution test was to eliminate claims from
inefficient competitors. However, even higher cost rivals can constrain
market price in the presence of monopoly pricing.11 6 The attribution test
can be criticised on the ground that it automatically excluded inefficient
rivals, which could lead to a reduction in consumer surplus and an
increase in allocative inefficiency. 11 Indeed, addressing this concern,
some have even advocated the imposition of a strict pass-on requirement
for any efficiency gains that the defendant advances as a justification for
the adoption of the practice in question. This is based on the notion that
113 ibid.
114 Economides and Lianos (n 33) 20-24.
115 Einer Elhauge (n 15).
116 Jonathan B. Baker, 'Predatory Pricing After Brooke Group: An Economic
Perspective' (1994) 62 Antritrust Law Journal 585, 591.
117 Einer Elhauge, 'Defining Better Monopolization Standards' (2003) 56 Stan. L. Rev.
253, 320-23.
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the primary goal of antitrust law may be the protection of the final
consumer from wealth transfers." 8
Despite recognising that 'in certain circumstances a less efficient
competitor may also exert a constraint which should be taken into account
when considering whether a particular price-based conduct leads to
anticompetitive foreclosure,' 119 the European Commission uses the
price/cost test as an efficiency filter to identify those competitors who are
at least as equally efficient as the dominant firm before moving to
examine whether there exists a case of anticompetitive foreclosure.120 In
other words, if it is a price-based exclusionary conduct, then the Guidance
will treat the less-efficient competitors as less worthy of protection from
the competition law regime. The Commission has not provided good
economic justifications for this.
As mentioned above, the introduction of price/non-price based
dichotomy also raises concern. Unlike price-related abuses, the exclusion
of less-efficient competitors remains an important consideration for non-
price based exclusionary conduct, such as tying.121 Once the other two
conditions are fulfilled, i.e. (1) the undertaking's dominant position in the
tying market, and (2) the fact that the tying and the tied products are
distinct, the Guidance does not exclude further analysis of the practice to
detect anticompetitive foreclosure.122 Again, such a distinction does not
seem to have drawn upon advances in economics, thereby creating many
conceptual difficulties.
The other issue is that the 'efficient competitor' filter does not
immunise rebates from antitrust challenges which are based on the
anticompetitive foreclosure test developed by the European judiciary. For
example, in Intel, the Commission observed that the efficient competitor
analysis is only 'one possible way of showing whether Intel's rebates and
payments were capable of causing or likely to cause anticompetitive
foreclosure.' 1 2 3 The frequent reference to the case law of the ECJ and of
118 Robert H. Lande, 'Wealth Transfers as the Original and Primary Concern of
Antitrust: The Efficiency Interpretation Challenged' (1982) 34 Hastings L. J. 65.
119 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13) para 24.
120 Economides and Lianos (n 33) 30.
121 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13) para 27.
122 ibid paras 52-58.
123 Intel (n 110) para 925.
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the CFI in the Commission's decisions creates uncertainty about the
application of the price-cost test in future cases.124
5. Recoupment is Unnecessary: the Predation Myth
Dominant firms can set the bundled prices at whatever level they like.
Therefore, in theory, the d-la-carte prices can be increased simultaneously
to levels above the 'but-for' levels. To a buyer, however, there would be a
'discount', if only illusory. 125 Profit sacrifice, therefore, is not a
necessity.126 The EU Commission has supported the idea that no profit
sacrifice is required on the dominant firm's part in a loyalty/requirement
rebate: 'Conditional rebates can have such [actual and potential
foreclosure] effects without necessarily entailing a sacrifice for the
dominant undertaking.' 127 'In this regard, the assessment of the
conditional rebates differs from that of predation, which always entails a
sacrifice.' 128
However, some commentators have rightly questioned whether the
frequency of such illusory discounts is sufficient to shape legal rules.12 9
Kattan, in particular, was keen to draw our attention to the great difficulty
in assessing the real reasons behind any price change for out-of-bundle
products. It is possible that such changes are related to quality,
performance, and product attributes, or indeed for a variety of other
supply and demand reasons without it being a 'penalty' that the
monopolist has imposed. 130 Indeed, this is one of the reasons that US
DOJ in its Section 2 Report has suggested screens and safe harbours to be
put in place to add certainty without harming antitrust enforcement. 131
124 Economides and Lianos (n 33) 34.
125 Patrick Greenlee, David S. Reitman, and David S. Sibley, 'An Antitrust Analysis
of Bundled Discounts' (2008) 26(5) Int L JIndus. Org 1132.
126 Daniel L. Rubinfeld, '3M's Bundled Rebates: An Economic Perspective' (2005) 72
U. Chi L. Rev. 243.
127 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13) para 37.
128 ibid.
129 Sherman Act s.2 Joint Hearing: Loyalty Discounts Session Hr'g Tr. 59, Nov.29,
2006 (Kattan).
130 ibid.
131 Department of Justice, 'Section 2 Report' (n 1).
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The key issue, again, is the theoretical complexity and the difficulty
in building a reliable tool to assess the potential harm that can be caused
by such bundled discounting arrangements. This raises the question of
whether the correct legal standard should focus on the conduct's effect on
competition rather than its relationship to defendant's cost structure.
6. The AMC Attribution Test Fails in Cases of Production
Differentiation
In cases where the rival's products offering differs either in variety or in
quality, it makes little sense to use the dominant firm's costs to evaluate
the survival of the rival's production. When the products are
differentiated, there may be an increase in consumer surplus from the
presence of added varieties and qualities offered by the competitors even
if they price above that of the dominant firm.13 2 For these reasons, the
AMC test fails as an appropriate measuring tool in the presence of
product differentiation.
Additionally, it may be difficult for a rival to calculate the effective
price offered by the monopolist to particular buyers accurately, for the
reason that the price paid by a particular buyer for the monopolist's
product B is usually dependent upon the sales of product A by the same
monopolist to the same buyer. This makes the price of product B opaque
to any rival, who will in turn find it hard to match that price on product B.
This uncertainty is probably going to soften price competition, something
that has skipped the AMC's attention in their design of the attribution
test.'3 3
7. Tying vs. Bundled Discounts in the Commission's Test
There is confusion in the EU Commission's approach as to whether
bundled discounts should be assessed as a type of tying abuse or as a
pricing abuse. 13 4 The Commission acknowledged in its Discussion Paper
that the distinction between mixed bundling and pure bundling (tying) is
132 Nicholas Economides, 'Quality Variations in the Circular Model of Variety-
Differentiated Products' (1993) 23 Regional, Sci & Urb Econ 235.
133 Economides (n 8).
134 EU Commission, Discussion Paper (n 97) paras 142-176.
169
UCL Journal ofLaw and Jurisprudence
not 'necessarily clear-cut'. 135 It explained that this was so because mixed
bundling may come close to pure bundling when the prices charged for
the individual offerings are high, and in such a case, mixed bundling can
have very similar effect on competition as tying.13 6
However, in other parts the Commission remarks that in mixed
bundling, none of the products is 'tied' in the traditional sense. 137
Nevertheless, the Discussion Paper seems to recognise that coercion in
tying and inducement in mixed bundling may produce the same effects on
customer choice. 38
Adding to the confusion, the Discussion Paper makes a distinction
between what the Commission calls 'commercial tying' (mixed bundling)
and 'contractual tying' and decides that only when the discount is so large
that 'efficient competitors offering only some but not all of the
components, cannot compete against the discounted bundled that a
bundled discount was found to infringe Article 82.' 139
However, in the subsequent Guidance the Commission took a
slightly different approach to the same problem. Despite adopting a
similar spirit by including 'multi-product rebates' within the
tying/bundling category, the Guidance chooses to make a distinction
between price-based and non-price-based exclusionary conduct, instead of
that between commercial and contractual tying.140
The European court thus acknowledged that bundled discounts may,
in certain circumstances, have an equivalent effect to tying. 141 The
Guidance however has not made clear the conceptual difference between
bundling and tying. Confusion could arise in cases where the same
practices could be evaluated under either the price-cost test for mixed
bundling, or the anticompetitive foreclosure test for tying. This is
obviously a highly unsatisfactory situation.
135 ibid para 112.
136 ibid.
137 ibid para 181.
138 ibid para 182.
139 ibid para 189.
140 EU Commission, Guidance (n 13), esp. paras 59-61.
141 Case T-201/04, Microsoft Corp. v Commission, 2007 E.C.R. 11-3601, para 908 (Crt.
First Instance). Although the Court did not indicate if it will adopt the same standard
as that for tying, the language used indicates that the CFI embraces the tying analogy.
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G. PURPOSES OF ANTITRUST LAW AND THE FUNDAMENTAL
LIMITATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS: THE BROADER PICTURE
1. How Cautious Should We Be?
It should be clear by now that the area of bundled discount really is one of
the most elusive areas of modem competition law. The complexity of the
economics behind it contributes greatly to the confusion for three main
reasons: (1) there are different theories of potential harm from bundling;
(2) there are different short run effects: bundling can soften prices in the
short run or raise them; and (3) whether bundling harms consumer
welfare is not clear even within a particular theory of harm: the specific
facts of the case matters a lot. The economic theories of bundling and
tying are far from settled and policymakers need to bear this in mind.14 2
Apart from recognising the certain limitations of the extent that
economics can inform legal thinking, the other important and unavoidable
debate is on the correct attitude that courts and enforcement authorities
should have when faced with antitrust allegations. As shown above, here
it is important to be aware of, and where necessary dispel, the (sometimes
irrational) assumptions that play a role in the assessment of such
allegations.14 3
Consistently with this warning, Hovenkamp argues strongly for a more
cautious approach by making the point that:144
No firm, not even a monopolist, is a trustee for another firm's economies of
scale. To force such a firm to hold a price umbrella over its rivals, selling at
above-cost prices in order to protect the rivals' inefficiently small production,
would be a blatant example of protecting competitors at the expense of
consumers.
This view was shared in the US submission to the OECD Roundtable. 1 4 5
142 Walker (n 31).
143 Part C-I of this paper.
144 Herbert Hovenkamp, 'Discounts and Exclusions' [2006] Utah Law Review 879.
145 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), Roundtable
on Bundled and Conditional Discounts and Rebates, United States submission,
DAF/COMP/WP3/WD (2008)
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/public/international/234014.pdf> accessed on 2 July 2012.
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On the subject of multi-product rebates, the DOJ in its Section 2
Report, while recognising the theoretical possibility for anticompetitive
conduct to come within the discount-allocation safe harbour, particularly
where 'bundled discount denies competitors the ability to attain
economies of scale', strongly believed that 'the potential chilling effect on
legitimate price discounting' was the most important reason to stop
further investigation of the conduct that comes within the safe harbour. 14 6
This was despite the risk of false negatives posed by the safe harbour and
the imperfect nature of the 'hypothetical equally efficient competitor'
concept on which the safe harbour was based.147 Geradin further adds that,
even if there are cases where above cost pricing could lead to foreclosure,
such cases would be rare.148
Lastly, and more generally speaking, there is something
fundamentally unsound about preventing firms from cutting their prices
on the grounds that this may eliminate rivals that may force these firms to
price even lower: it is completely speculative. Trading current price-cuts
for such speculative 'future price-cuts' may not be a good idea as far as
antitrust law is concerned.149 Hovenkamp has gone even further to argue
that 'when a particular form of behaviour is too complex for reliable
analysis, then the only defensible antitrust rule is to let the market rather
than the courts control... The basic rule should be non-intervention unless
the court is confident that it has identified anti-competitive conduct and
can apply an effective remedy." 50
2. The Absence of Empirical Analysis
The economic literature in this area is still underdeveloped and that there
is a lack of empirical evidence on how bundling actually affects
competition. And while recent articles have shown that bundled discounts
146 Department of Justice, 'Section 2 Report' (n 1).
147 OECD, Roundtable (n 145) para 25.
148 Geradin (n 5).
149 Einer Elhauge, 'Why Above-Cost Price Cuts To Drive Out Entrants Are Not
Predatory - and the Implications for Defining Costs and Market Power' (2003) 112
Yale Law Journal 68 1.
150 Herbert Hovenkamp, The Antitrust Enterprise: Principle and Execution (Harvard
University Press 2005) 47.
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can, in theory, exclude competitors, the models that they have used are
often built on unrealistic assumptions.' 5 '
Muris and Smith have argued that, demonstrating that
anticompetitive harm is theoretically possible in certain specified
demand-cost environments, is not sufficient to show that such harm is
likely or that any potential for harm would outweigh any demonstrable
benefits from the bundling practice. They have further asserted
that 'antitrust rules and tests that cannot be administered accurately are
often worse than no rules at all.'1 52
Kobayashi echoes their view by identifying several characteristics of
the currently available economic literature on commodity bundling as (1)
focusing on theoretical treatments of bundling and identifying the wide
range of reasons why firms might engage in bundling; (2) generally
containing restrictive assumptions, e.g. assumptions regarding the
existence of monopoly and the nature of rivalry; and (3) generally
suppressing the more obvious and ubiquitous reasons for which firms may
use bundling.15 3
3. Error Costs and Trade-Offs: Choosing the Right Analytical
Framework
Ahlborn and Barley have theorised that in designing antitrust polices
relating to bundled discounts, the policy makers face two fundamental
trade-offs: a trade-off between false positives and false negatives, and a
trade-off between error costs on one hand and administrative costs on the
other.15 4 It is increasingly recognised that some form of economic welfare
(consumer welfare or total welfare) should be the benchmark for
competition policy. This means that any legal rules governing discounting
practices should 'minimize its enforcement costs, remedy its error costs
and its administrative costs.'" 55 Indeed, Posner goes as far as saying that
151 Timothy J. Muris and Vernon L. Smith, 'Antitrust and Bundled Discounts: An
Experimental Analysis' (2008-09) 75 Antitrust L.1 399; Areeda and Hovenkamp (n
29).
152 ibid.
153 Kobayashi, 'The Economics of Loyalty Discounts and Antitrust Law in the United
States' (n 47).
154 Ahlborn and Bailey (n 82) 115.
155 ibid 114.
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the goal of legal rules is to minimise the sum of error costs and direct
costs. 156
Detailed discussions on enforcement and administrative costs are
beyond the scope of this article. Instead, its main concern is how to design
a set of optimal antitrust policies for bundled discounts that can both
guard desirable price-cutting activities by the dominant firms and expose
those arrangements that pose serious threat to the competitiveness of the
market. More specifically, this means aiming to minimise error costs
through the construction of appropriate legal rules in the first place.
The factors needed to be taken into account have been summarised
as follows: 'the greater the frequency of pro-competitive relative to anti-
competitive discounts, the greater the relative frequency of false positives;
and the greater the cost of false positives, the more permissible should be
the legal rule.' 1 57
However, there are major difficulties in achieving this optimal policy
design, which are due to the following three factors: (1) the relatively
infrequent case law tackling the specific area of bundled discount, making
it difficult to build a reliable record of the frequencies of the two types of
error costs; (2) the absence of any unifying theories of harm from the
economic literature; and (3) lack of consensus among the judiciary or the
central governing bodies in both the US and the EU on the most suitable
test that can be deployed to separate the pro-competitive from the anti-
competitive types of bundled discounts.
4. How Different Purposes of Competition Law Regimes Come into
Play: a Comparative Perspective
Recall the central element of the ECJ Michelin II decision, which was
'not all competition on price can be regarded as legitimate." 58 The court
was emphasising the need for multi-product dominant firms to compete
on the merits with their competitors and so to grant discounts only if
economically justified. In comparison, the Ninth Circuit in Cascade
Health Solutions relied on the fact that bundled discounts are a 'pervasive
156 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis ofLaw (7th edn. Aspen Publishers 2007)
593.
157 Ahlborn and Bailey (n 82).
Michelin II (n 89) para 97.
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practice' employed by both large and small corporations and called for a
more lenient approach from the US antitrust regime.159
These two cases and their contrasting attitudes on 'price'
competition highlight a strong contrast between EU and US treatment of
dominant firms or monopolies. I argue that this is because their respective
competition law systems were designed to serve different purposes
respectively to begin with. What s. 2 of the Sherman Act prohibits is
monopolisation. This, as some commentators explain, means that the
likelihood that the conduct in question was designed to expand monopoly
power could be strongly undermined if the same practice is also used by
non-dominant firms.160 Article 102 EC, on the other hand, has a different
structure and regulatory purpose. As Hovenkamp explains, '[it is] less
concerned about the creation of dominant positions and more focused on
regulating their behaviour once dominance has been achieved."161
Thus, while the fact that a practice is pervasive in the economy is a
relevant factor in the US, it is not so in the enforcement of art. 82, as
dominant firms in the EU are expected to carry greater responsibility in
the preservation of the marketplace. Advocate General Kokott's opinion
in British Airways highlights this point succinctly:162
Within the scope of the application of Article 82 EC, a dominant undertaking is
subject to certain limitations that do not apply to other undertakings in the same
form... [The undertaking in a dominant position] has a particular responsibility
to ensure that its conduct does not undermine effective and undistorted
competition in the common market. A practice which would be unobjectionable
under normal circumstances can be an abuse if applied by an undertaking in a
dominant position.
159 Cascade Health Solutions (n 56).
160 Economides and Lianos (n 33) 22.
161 Herbert J. Hovenkamp, 'The Legal Periphery of Dominant Firm Conduct' in Abel
M. Mateus and Teresa Moreira (eds) Competition Law and Economics: Advances in
Competition Policy Enforcement in the EU and North America (Edward Elgar 2010)
238.
162 British Airways (n 88), Opinion of AG Kokott <http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:62004CC0095:EN:NOT>
accessed on 2 July 2012, para 23.
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This is also the reason why in the EU context the fact that non-dominant
firms also use the same practice is irrelevant, as the purpose of art. 102 is
to impose special responsibilities on dominant undertakings. This would
be a totally different case in the US. Additionally, art. 102 reaches
significantly lower market shares. I think it suggests that in cases where
the undertaking has a dominant position, the scope of art. 102 is broader
than the scope of s.2 of the Sherman Act.
Such differences in the fundamental purpose of the EU and US
antitrust regimes will inevitably translate into a differing degree of
willingness to risk committing either Type I errors or Type II errors by
their enforcement authorities.
H. CONCLUSION
In this paper, I carried out a detailed examination on many of the key
issues surrounding the antitrust treatment of bundled discounts in the
United States and Europe. On the subject of economic justifications for
bundled discounting practices, Elhauge argues that pricing that varies
together with the buyers' demand, and in turn offers one buyer a greater
discount than another, is difficult to justify on efficiency grounds.16 3
This argument highlights the particular challenge that we face:
namely, that bundled discounts as a potential form of exclusionary
conduct is multidimensional. Economic explanations that can successfully
apply to one sub-category of such practices may not necessarily apply to
another.
Despite the recent increase in economic literature on the topic of
bundled discounts, the theoretical and empirical analyses of such practice
as a potentially exclusionary mechanism are 'relatively recent and
sparse'.164 The judiciary, antitrust scholars and enforcement authorities
have so far been unable to agree on a set of coherent principles to guide
the design of liability standards in this area. The fact that there is no
unifying theory of harm has also contributed greatly to the elusive
character of this area of competition law.
163 Einer Elhauge, United States Antitrust Law and Economics (Foundation Press 2008)
415.
164 LePage 's (n 63), Brief of the United States as Amicus Curiae
<http://www.justice.gov/atr/cases/f203900/203900.htm> accessed on 2 July 2012.
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A common approach adopted by academic scholars in an attempt to
overcome this obstacle is to examine bundled discounting practices under
frameworks that are somewhat similar to those with which we are more or
less already familiar. To this end, some have advocated for a liability
standard that draws from both predatory pricing and tying.165 In contrast,
some prefer to adopt a slightly modified version of either of these two.
There are also scholars proposing a unified 'structured rule of reason' test
for bundling, tying and loyalty/requirement program.166
The problem is that antitrust categories are not always clear cut. It is
often possible to fit a case into several specific and distinct categories.
Therefore, there is a real danger of the same case being scrutinised under
completely different liability standards, thereby creating theoretical
confusion and undermining legal certainty, purely because it is put into
one antitrust category rather than another.
It is also important to note that antitrust categories are not mere
analytical tools, but reflective of the objects and underlying premises of
the entire competition law system in which they operate.167 Thus, on the
most fundamental level, the analysis should be what the antitrust regime
as a whole is trying to achieve. Rather than designating a case as a
'bundled discounts', 'tying' or 'exclusive dealing' etc., and trying to
apply pre-determined models to cases, a better approach may be to go
back to first principles: what is the theory of harm that we seek to rely
upon, and what evidence we need to substantiate it.
For now, what I hope this paper has succeeded in showing is that the
antitrust treatment of bundled discounts and rebates is an area of
competition law that demands substantial on-going conversations between
the judiciary, the enforcement authorities and the wider academia as a
whole.
165 E.g. Areeda and Hovenkamp (n 29) 251.
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